On the eve of the First World War the post of the US Ambassador at St. Petersburg was vacant and interrelations between two powers were rather cool. In July 1914, the ambassadorship to Russia was offered to an international lawyer and active Democratic supporter George T. Marye but in the early 1916 he was forced to resign as a result of his inability to meet Wilson's hopes. With Crane's assistance a new ambassador in the person of Governor Francis was appointed and Harper was named an unofficial advisor to accompany him to Russia. 4 As his biographer wrote, in his mature years Francis represented "the perfect image of a successful American businessman and civic leader" and was "proud of his contributions to the community, pleased with his accomplishments and with himself." He was "a brash, opinionated, stubborn, smart, sometimes foolish, straight-talking, quick-acted, independent-minded, proud, self-made man." Francis "was rich and getting richer, busy with his directorships and his civic duties, regularly travelling the country to speak to large audiences and meet with other powerful men, who were his friends."
In the meantime, as the editor of his letters noted, "Francis was shrewd and capable in the world he knew, but international diplomacy was not in that world." 6 The Russian ambassador in Washington characterized him as a thriving provincial businessman with a good fortune and great self-assurance. 7 The new American ambassador had but a little international experience, no theoretical preparation, no practical knowledge, no diplomatic abilities required for the post. In George F. Kennan's opinion, "Francis was not what you would call a cosmopolitan person. He was a product of the old West, a 'provincial' in the best sense of the term, in whose character there was reflected something of the 'showboat' Mississippi: the vigor, the earthiness, the slightly flamboyant elegance, and the uninhibited enjoyment of the good things of life. His values and opinions were, at his age of 67, firmly established, and were not to be essentially shaken even by the experience of residence in a foreign capital in dramatic times." 8 He was made a diplomat by chance as a consequence of a "Democratic débauche" in the Foreign Service and demoralization of the State Department that followed Woodrow Wilson's rise to presidency.
Francis sailed for Russia on April 8, 1916, leaving his family at home. He was accompanied by his African-American valet Philip Jordan. Arthur Ruhl, who crossed the Atlantic on the same steamboat, remembered that "his man Friday, Phil, a body-servant of the old-fashioned Southern kind, already mourning, after but a week of foreign ways, for the hot biscuits of St. Louis." 9 Harper, another Francis' companion, wrote after several days of cruise: "I heard enough of them to realize that our new ambassador was a very blunt, outspoken American, who believed in speaking his mind regardless of the rules of diplomacy." 10 Francis arrived at Petrograd in the morning on April 15 (28) and was met at the station by the embassy people. Staff of the US embassy in the Russian capital at the moment consists of nine men. The senior diplomat was a veteran Herbert H.D. Pierce, a Special Agent of the State Department with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary, appointed in 1915 to assist the ambassador in Russia. Long before this appointment he served in Russia for seven years and his prolonged experience taught him that the "entire social fabric of Russia, the point of view of the Russian mind and its manner of thought, differ widely from our own, and are not susceptible of estimation upon the same basis of comparison." 11 Francis had not enough time to know this lesson because his cooperation with the experienced adviser was very short. The next in rank was first secretary of the embassy Fred M. 
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Within a few months after the reception, almost the whole embassy staff was substituted. In May and June 1916 attaché Baker and all secretaries were reappointed to other posts. Harper also left Petrograd in August. Dearing, who was very critical of embassy's work and elaborated plans "to revamp U.S. Embassy," entered into conflict with Francis and in the fall of the year left Russia without a new appointment in the Foreign Service. In the course of 1916 secretaries Norman Armour, Sheldon Whitehouse, and Livingston Phelps joined the staff, followed by first secretary James G. Bailey in the early 1917. Of great help to Francis were the appointments of J. Butler Wright as counselor and William C. Huntington as commercial attaché later in 1916. The last imperial Russian foreign minister stated that Francis produced "an impression of not a diplomat, but a businessman, as well as all his embassy staff; even their residence was more like a commercial office than an embassy". In his opinion, only Wright and Huntington looked like real diplomats. "Especially Huntington was able to serve as an example for foreign diplomats."
13
Counselor Wright arrived at his post on November 4 (17), 1916, and found a staff beset with disorganization and inefficiency. Francis seemed "a rather daft, grandfatherly country gentlemen" with "great sense of nature, good keenness and common sense." But as ambassador he had "very little conception of the social amenities as regards the Diplomatic Service." As the weeks passed, Wright and many of the embassy staff worried that the ambassador's inexperience might cause him to do something foolhardy and embarrassing. As a result Wright and his colleagues hovered nervously around the ambassador, creating a tense work environment.
14 "Wright performed his duties with great conscientiousness, but found it difficult to strike the right tone in his relation to Francis," Kennan wrote, "In Wright's eyes, Francis personified all the characteristic weakness of the political appointee in a diplomatic position. In Francis' eyes, Wright manifested the worst traits of the career officer." The staff of the US ConsulateGeneral at Petrograd consisted of five people headed by an experienced diplomat North Winship.
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Most of the people named above was not mentioned in the Francis' ego-centric memoirs or mentioned but scarcely. The ambassador constantly presents on the first plan in his self-centered memoirs. For example, Francis wrote practically nothing about the Second Division that carried out the main part of the embassy's routine jobs. Meantime most of secretaries and attachés were more informed and experienced in their duties than the ambassador in his ones. Unfortunately, Francis' "awkwardness made itself felt in the Ambassador's relations with his career associates,-Kennan noted.-He could not help but be aware of their greater familiarity both with diplomatic life in general and with the Petrograd Arriving at Petrograd, Francis found that the state of the embassy building was a problem. The US Embassy rented the mansion of Count Michael N. Grabbe on Furshtatskaya street. The ambassador had his office on the second floor, near two small private rooms that Philip Jordan had furnished as his bedroom and sitting room. But this poorly furnished "palace" was considered a "laughing stock among Russians and diplomats alike," chargé Charles S. Wilson reported.
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Francis was appalled at the rundown condition and inadequate furnishing of the embassy that was described by an eyewitness as looking more like a warehouse than a residence. "It is a large house and susceptible of being made very attractive, but it is out of repair and has little furniture and no furnishing whatever," the ambassador wrote to his son. Francis was obliged to advance his own cash to pay for a dining room suite, kitchen utensils and supplies, curtains, and shades.
25
From another side, the Francis residence was located "in a fashionable part of the city lying between its center and the Tauride district to the east. Since this latter district included the later Soviet headquarters at the Smolny Institute, as well as the Parliament building, the American Embassy found itself in the midst of some of the most dramatic and violent happenings of the revolutionary period."
26
Francis' personal connections in the Russian capital were rather limited. As Kennan noted, "Francis' taste and habits were the robust and simple ones of the American Middle West at the turn of the century. As such, they bore little affinity to the refined predilections of continental diplomatic society." The "Governor's preference for an evening's entertainment ran to good cigars, good whisky, and a few cronies around the card . "Francis seems to have found no easy approach to his diplomatic colleagues,"-Kennan noted.-"They, for their part, tended either to ignore him or to view him with amusement and condescension. His rare diplomatic dinners … failed to accord with the standards of diplomatic elegance then prevailing in the Russian capital." But he was not able to realize then how difficult it would prove! His main assignment in Russia was to negotiate a new commercial treaty instead of the old 1832 treaty abrogated by the US government in 1911. Surprisingly for the instigators of the abrogation this sanction did not affect Russian policy at all. The abrogation had accomplished nothing. Meanwhile, Russian-American relations were frigid and the abrogation only added to existing difficulties. 41 Woodrow Wilson himself actively supported the abrogation in search for votes at the eve of the 1912 election but becoming President he was forced to try to restore normal commercial relations with Russia. Ambassador Marye could not accomplish the task. And now, the military correspondent Richard W. Child wrote in 1916, we "need diplomatic and commercial representation in Russia of a standard of excellence which can eradicate a growing suspicion of our sordidness;" we "need the proper official representation also because at the end of the war we must strive to make a commercial treaty with Russia." Francis had one-sided view of internal situation in late Imperial Russia influenced by his acquaintances in liberal Russian circles. As Harper noted, the ambassador quickly had "interested himself in the work and views of the people's organizations, whose leaders were soon to head the revolution of March, 1917." 49 A prospect of revolution was first hinted by him as early as August 1916, when Francis reported to the Secretary of State: "I do not think there will be a revolution immediately after the close of the war," but "if the Court Party does not adopt a more liberal policy by extending more privileges to the people and their representatives in the Duma, a revolution will take place before the lapse of even a few years." 50 "It is more than interesting to be in the position which I occupy at this time,"-Francis wrote in December 1916.-"This is the most critical period of the world's history in my opinion, and Petrograd is occupying a very prominent place in the theater of affairs -in fact it is second to none."
51 Francis anticipated some events of importance in Russian history but was sure that "there is no danger of a revolution before the end of the war." Only after the Emperor's abdication he recognized that "This is undoubtedly a revolution, but it is the best managed revolution that has ever taken place for its magnitude." The US ambassador was the first foreign diplomat who posed the question of recognition of the Russian Provisional government. Three days after the Emperor abdication Francis telegraphed to Washington his reasons for speedy recognition trying to convince Lansing that it was "the most amazing revolution" which was "the practical realization of that principle of government which we have championed and advocated, I mean government by consent of the governed."
57
To his mind the Russian revolution was the equivalent of the American one almost a century and a half before.
58
His decision was influenced also by the new Russian foreign minister Pavel N. Milyukov who found in Francis "a credulous interlocutor." 59 Milyukov himself recalled: "The Ambassador from the United States, the dear Francis (who was in no way a diplomat), clearly wanted America to be the first to recognize the Russian revolution, and I willingly entered a little conspiracy with him."
60 As George Buchanan noted ironically, "The United States Ambassador was the first to recognize the Provisional Government officially on March 22, an achievement of which he was always proud." 61 But Francis was not able to follow the rapid and chaotic sweep of events that led Russia from one crisis to another. His view of unfolding events was limited and based on illusions. Francis confessed such "assumptions concerning the Russian situation" which "were least likely to be fulfilled," namely, "that Russian political life would advance at once toward a stable parliamentary system and that Russia would continue to wage war." 62 "In the euphoria that followed the tsar's abdication, Francis and other U.S. officials neglected the deeper social and economic origins of the revolution, underestimated the strength of the Soviet, and exaggerated the power of the Provisional Government. An inflated notion of the influence and authority of the Duma leaders distorted Francis' perspective and alleviated his concern about the unpredictability of the workers and soldiers." "That revolution and our entering the war, so nearly contemporaneous as they were, mark a new era in the history of society," Francis reported. "Our form of government is their model; our taking part in the contest has infused into them a confident spirit and imbued them with a firm determination."
66 As Francis stated a bit later, "in my judgment the American Embassy is respected to a greater extent and has more influence with the Provisional Government and with the people generally than any other mission in Russia."
67
Owing to his position as envoy of Russia's new powerful ally, Francis indeed enjoyed a rather elusive prestige in Petrograd. But his ambassadorial position was compromised and diminished by the flux of special US missions with no clearly defined responsibilities which one after another was arriving on the Petrograd scene during the summer of 1917.
The first of them were the Railway or Stevens Commission and the so-called Root Mission. Francis readily supported the former and even tried to direct its activities but was reluctant as to the advisability of the latter which was sent by the Wilson administration regardless of the ambassador's opinion. From the very beginning the question of confusion of authority arose. As Root remarked, "It is plain that we can't have three bodies dealing with the Russian Government at the same time-the regular Embassy, the President's Mission & the R.R.
Commission."

68
But Wilson refused to define authority clearly. As a result, Stevens sometimes interfered to diplomatic matters, Root discussed railroad questions, and Francis tried to do everything maneuvering between two chiefs of missions and different branches of the Russian government. The Root Mission departed Petrograd on June 26 (July 9) leaving behind the US Military Mission which turned out to be one more quasi-political body representing special Army interests. It was headed by Br.-General William V. Judson.
Probably, the most exotic was the American Red Cross Mission (ARCM) which soon arrived at Petrograd to add more embarrassments for the ambassador. The mission was promoted by a Montana copper magnate William B. Thompson who tried to use it as an instrument of America's support of Russia's continued participation in the war. Neither the ambassador nor other official representatives on the scene felt that there was a need for such a mission.
69
The result was deplorable misunderstanding between the ARCM and the US embassy. Bullard described the situation in the following words: "No one of the ambassadors was of strong enough character to dominate and control his own flock. Grouped, about each embassy, there were military missions, secret services, publicity agents, commercial attachés, all busily engaged in trying to serve their country, but with no one to co-ordinate their actions. They were continually getting in each other's way." And, he added. "Our own representatives-embassy, military mission, Red Cross, and consulates-were just as bitterly divided." 74 At the same time the ambassador's "neglect of discerning reports" by his more competent and informed subordinates "meant that Francis denied himself real familiarity with the Russian situation."
75
In the mid-September J. Butler Wright noted in his diary that amid rumors "that the 'Bolshevik' sentiment is growing in strength throughout the country everyone, with only the exception of D.R.F., believes that a clash-and a serious one-is bound to occur soon." The counselor was amused by "the glowing reports of D.R.F." which were not distinguished by brilliant insights or farsighted prescriptions.
76 On the morning of October 26 (November 8), 1917, Francis once more woke up in a completely new country. "Situation here undetermined but this Bolshevik government can not survive and I think will collapse within few days," Francis telegraphed to
Washington on the fourth day of the October Revolution. All the significant American representatives in Petrograd jointly agreed to recommend opening informal channels of communication with the Bolshevik government in order to coordinate actions against Germany. The American community was united on one other issue as well: the necessity of replacing the ambassador with someone more reliable and with better judgment.
81 After Francis' conviction was proved wrong by the Bolshevik seizure of power, the sense that the elderly ambassador was tired, confused, and out of touch with
Russian reality contributed to a movement by other US envoys in Russia to have him recalled. 82 Sisson, the prime instigator of the recall move, reported on November 21 (December 4): "Found Ambassador without policy except anger at Bolsheviks, unamenable to arguments or entreaties of his official advisers, military and civil." In his opinion "no fruitful work can be done here by any division of our Government so long as Francis remains in charge of Embassy." The ambassador "impress every one as a sick man absolutely unfitted to the strain physical and mental of his great post," Sisson added.
83
The next day Judson wrote in his diary that Francis "seems to me completely exhausted and overwrought by the strain he has recently been under." Vladimir Lenin responded by pointing to the extremely dangerous situation in which Russian troops found themselves in the Romanian front. Nevertheless, the Romanians were released the following day and then deported from Russia. Significantly, unpublished version of the Francis' memoirs differs in this particular case from the published one. 89 In the course of further events Francis was becoming increasingly isolated-from Washington, the Soviet government, and his own staff. 90 On February 7, 1918, Harper concluded that a new ambassador was needed because "men of wide vision and men of action are required at this most critical post." 91 At the same time, Robins was bound to appear in Petrograd as "the real American Ambassador" and thus to diminish Francis' prestige and his potential usefulness in the formal ambassadorial position.
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By the end of January the wife of the naval attaché at Petrograd came to a conclusion that there was "no place for Americans! There is nothing that they can accomplish."
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The same day the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk interrupted peace negotiations giving a pretext for German offensive which begun on February 18, 1918, and created danger for Petrograd. 94 Two days later at a conference of Allied representatives the decision had been made to abandon the Russian capital. While the Soviet government was preparing to escape to Moscow the Americans made a choice in favor of Vologda, a railroad junction 300 miles to the east of Petrograd. There Francis might decide to continue his way further east until Vladivostok or to go to Arkhangel'sk in the Northern Russia. On February 26 & 27 the American colony consisted of more than 60 people left Petrograd.
95 It included the embassy staff, officers of the military mission, Red Cross and YMCA people, personnel of the New York City Bank, and some other Americans. Most of the other diplomatic missions followed the Americans or joined them later. Thus Vologda turned to be a "diplomatic capital of Russia", as Francis termed the city.
"I went out from Petrograd to Vologda to see Mr. Francis early in March 1918, ten days after all the embassies had fled from the panic-stricken capital," the theatric critic Oliver M. Sayler wrote. "The day I arrived in Vologda, the Ambassador gave out to the Russian press the following statement, which was copied throughout Russia: … America still counts itself an ally of the Russian people and we shall be ready to help, no matter what Government organizes a vigorous resistance to the German invasion." "Here again, with all its genuine sympathy, was the same misunderstanding of the social revolution as a mere political quarrel,"-concluded the author.-"Here again was the delusion in which most people outside Russia resisted-the delusion that Russia could fight once more if she wished to."
96
News of the Brest-Litovsk treaty concluding on March 3, 1918, quickly reached Vologda. Francis decided to "inveigh against Brest-Litovsk" hoping to destroy it especially after the Murmansk experiment where the Allies cooperated with the local Soviet in the joint efforts to organize anti-German front. On April 5, Francis telegraphed to Lansing: "Transportation conditions deplorable and require improvement, which we can best render having demonstrated our ability thereof by bettering Soviet government service." The ambassador even suggested "to place American Railway Commission in charge of Soviet government." "Furthermore, in event of Allied intervention from east or west or both, railroad efficiency is essential," he continued. Francis recommended to ignore "mistakes of Soviet government and outrages practiced" in order to "induce Soviet government to ask Allied assistance, so that when Allies enter Russia, will not with Soviet government's refusal, but Soviet government's welcome." 97 By May 2, Francis had decided that "time for Allied intervention has arrived" because the Russian people were ready to welcome it. 98 On June 4, after the Czecho-Slovak revolt, he made a trip to Petrograd trying to establish contact with anti-Bolshevik forces in the former capital on the assumption that soon the Bolshevik power would collapse.
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In his opinion, the Czecho-Slovak case might justify the intervention of the Allied powers in Russia.
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"Russian people confidently expecting Allied intervention and will welcome it," Francis stated. "Russian people are expecting 95 Francis' diplomatic career is a particular case of Wilsonianism with its liberal illusions and democratic prejudices. That is why Francis' failure as a diplomat may be considered as a display of Woodrow Wilson's greater diplomatic fiasco which culminated in the Senate refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty. Francis was an ordinary American politician with a rather narrow provincial outlook. Finding himself in Petrograd he wished to see in Russia as another America. But Russia is a world in itself, and a foreign embassy is not the best point for observation. History itself, with the magnitude of events, was against Francis. Nevertheless he was not the worst of the US ambassadors in Russia. Francis was not, of course, the right man in the right place, but obviously he deserves sympathy and his memoirs-the closest attention.
